

117TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6367

To promote security partnership with Ukraine.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 10, 2022

Mr. McCAUL (for himself, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. TURNER, Ms. STEFANIK, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. KINZINGER, Ms. TENNEY, Mr. WITTMAN, Mr. WALTZ, and Mrs. WAGNER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Armed Services, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote security partnership with Ukraine.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Guaranteeing Ukrainian Autonomy by Reinforcing its
6 Defense (GUARD) Act of 2022”.

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
8 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—A DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING UKRAINE

- Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 102. Strategy on United States diplomatic support for Ukraine.
- Sec. 103. United States ambassador to Ukraine.
- Sec. 104. Potential designation of the Government of Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.
- Sec. 105. Extension and modification of limitation on military cooperation between the United States and Russia.

TITLE II—BOLSTERING UKRAINE’S DETERRENCE AGAINST
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

- Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
- Sec. 202. Amendment to presidential drawdown authority.
- Sec. 203. Foreign Military Financing.
- Sec. 204. Expedited excess defense articles transfer program.
- Sec. 205. Strategy on excess defense articles from allies.
- Sec. 206. Report on Ukrainian capabilities to counter air-based threats.
- Sec. 207. International Military Education and Training cooperation with Ukraine.
- Sec. 208. Strategy on IMET programming in Ukraine.
- Sec. 209. Sense of Congress on loan program.
- Sec. 210. United States-Ukraine strategic security partnership.
- Sec. 211. Strategy to protect Ukraine’s defense industry from strategic competitors.
- Sec. 212. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 213. Expanded broadcasting in countries of the former Soviet Union to combat Russian disinformation and information operations.
- Sec. 214. Strategy on INCLE programming in Ukraine.
- Sec. 215. Strategy for cooperation on intermediate-range missile launchers and systems to NATO allies.

TITLE III—SECURING UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIA’S USE OF
ENERGY AS A WEAPON

- Sec. 301. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Nord Stream 2.
- Sec. 302. Congressional review of waiver under Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019.
- Sec. 303. Application of congressional review under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
- Sec. 304. Consideration of information provided by Congress in imposing sanctions.
- Sec. 305. Inclusion of matter relating to Nord Stream 2 in report under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
- Sec. 306. Ukraine security assistance initiative.
- Sec. 307. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

1 **TITLE I—A DETERRENCE POLICY**

2 **REGARDING UKRAINE**

3 **SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

4 It is the policy of the United States to—

1 (1) support the territorial integrity and sov-
2 ereignty of Ukraine;

3 (2) declassify or downgrade United States intel-
4 ligence, consistent with the need to protect sources
5 and methods, on Russian malign activities in
6 Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic and Black Sea na-
7 tions, to the maximum extent possible, to enable and
8 encourage dissemination to United States allies and
9 partners and to the American public;

10 (3) provide critical capabilities, including sur-
11 face-to-air missiles, air defense systems, anti-ship
12 missiles, anti-tank mines, and others, to Ukraine on
13 an expedited basis;

14 (4) reaffirm “the freedom of States to choose
15 their own security arrangements,” as pledged in the
16 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, to which
17 Russia was a signatory;

18 (5) demand the Government of Russia reaffirms
19 its commitment to agreements to which it is a signa-
20 tory, including the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the
21 1990 Charter of Paris, and the 1994 Budapest
22 Memorandum;

23 (6) remain fully committed to NATO’s Open
24 Door Policy, which provides a path to membership
25 for any European country that shares our values

1 and meets the necessary responsibilities and obliga-
2 tions;

3 (7) continue to fully support NATO’s decision
4 in the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration, re-
5 affirmed ever since, including in the June 2021
6 Brussels Summit, that Ukraine and Georgia will be-
7 come NATO members;

8 (8) commit to include all relevant European
9 countries in discussions about European security
10 and to prioritize existing mechanisms, such as the
11 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
12 rope and the NATO-Russia Council, for those dis-
13 cussions;

14 (9) reject the proposals publicized on December
15 17, 2021, by the Government of Russia as a legiti-
16 mate basis of negotiations on European security
17 issues;

18 (10) repudiate Russia’s proposal for a “deploy-
19 ment moratorium” in the European theater for in-
20 termediate-range ground launched missile systems
21 that were previously banned under the Intermediate
22 Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty until Russia re-
23 peatedly violated the agreement causing its demise;

1 (11) encourage near-term, in-person visits by
2 United States and Ukraine leaders to each other’s
3 countries;

4 (12) support the rapid deployment of additional
5 observers from the Organization for Security and
6 Cooperation in Europe to monitor the Ukraine-Rus-
7 sian border and report aggressive acts; and

8 (13) continue the current United States nuclear
9 declaratory policy of “calculated ambiguity” and re-
10 ject changes to United States nuclear declaratory
11 policy of “calculated ambiguity” and reject changes
12 to United States nuclear declaratory policy that
13 would invite further Russian aggression and under-
14 mine NATO unity, and tempt nuclear proliferation,
15 such as “Sole Purpose,” “Fundamental Purpose,”
16 or “No First Use”.

17 **SEC. 102. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUP-**
18 **PORT FOR UKRAINE.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
20 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
21 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
22 a report with a strategy on how the United States will
23 work to diplomatically support Ukraine during fiscal years
24 2022 through 2026.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
2 section (a) shall include the following elements:

3 (1) A description of how relevant departments
4 and agencies of the United States Government will
5 work together to collectively support efforts by the
6 Government of Ukraine to deter Russian aggression
7 in the form of military incursions, cyber attacks, the
8 coercive use of energy resources, the disruption of
9 lawful commerce and traffic to Ukrainian ports, use
10 of passportization, efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian
11 political and economic systems, and attempts to ma-
12 nipulate the public through disinformation cam-
13 paigns.

14 (2) A description of the United States current
15 efforts and strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic
16 initiatives when they align with United States inter-
17 ests.

18 (3) A strategy on how the United States will
19 use its voice and vote at the United Nations, OSCE,
20 Council of Europe, NATO, and other relevant inter-
21 national bodies to support Ukraine and its reform
22 efforts.

23 (4) A strategy on how the United States will
24 assist Ukraine in bolstering its diplomatic, economic,
25 energy, and maritime relationships with key Black

1 Sea countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey,
2 and Georgia.

3 (5) A strategy on how the United States will
4 engage with Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia
5 to advance the Normandy Format and Minsk Agree-
6 ments, including—

7 (A) to set Russia’s adherence to an imme-
8 diate and comprehensive cease-fire and the
9 withdrawal of Russian forces, military equip-
10 ment and mercenaries from the territory of
11 Ukraine as prerequisites to further negotiations
12 on other provisions of the Minsk Agreements;
13 and

14 (B) to ensure Kyiv is not obliged to alter
15 the status of the areas in the Donbas illegally
16 occupied by Russian-backed separatists in a
17 manner that would permanently undermine the
18 Government of Ukraine’s full sovereignty over
19 the region or foreclose its freedom to choose its
20 own security arrangements and foreign policy
21 trajectory.

22 (6) An assessment of Ukraine’s recent progress
23 on anti-corruption reforms and a strategy on how
24 the United States will work with allies to continue

1 to engage Ukraine to ensure meaningful progress on
2 democratic, economic, and anti-corruption reforms.

3 (7) A description of the views of United States
4 European allies and partners, including Ukraine and
5 NATO members that joined the alliance in 1999 or
6 after, of the proposals publicized on December 17,
7 2021, by the Government of Russia.

8 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
9 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
10 a classified annex.

11 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
12 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
13 gressional committees” means—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
15 Senate; and

16 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
17 House of Representatives.

18 **SEC. 103. UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) President Biden’s failure to appoint a
21 United States ambassador to Ukraine has under-
22 mined the United States-Ukraine bilateral relation-
23 ship and has played into Russia’s calculus regarding
24 its military buildup in and around Ukraine; and

1 (2) President Biden should move to expedi-
2 tiously submit to the Senate for its advice-and-con-
3 sent a nominee for the Ambassador to Ukraine that
4 has experience addressing the Russian problem set
5 and serving in war zones or conflict areas.

6 **SEC. 104. POTENTIAL DESIGNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT**
7 **OF RUSSIA AS A STATE SPONSOR OF TER-**
8 **RORISM.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
11 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
12 propriate congressional committees a determination that
13 indicates whether the Government of Russia meets the cri-
14 teria to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.

15 (b) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM DEFINED.—In
16 this section, the term “state sponsor of terrorism” means
17 a country, the government of which the Secretary of State
18 has determined, for purposes of section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i)
19 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.
20 4813(c)(1)(A)(i)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
21 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms
22 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provi-
23 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided
24 support for acts of international terrorism.

1 (c) TERMINATION.—The reporting requirement au-
 2 thorized under subsection (a) shall terminate 2 years after
 3 the date of the enactment of this Act.

4 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
 5 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
 6 gressional committees” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
 8 Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
 10 House of Representatives.

11 **SEC. 105. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION**
 12 **ON MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE**
 13 **UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.**

14 (a) EXTENSION.—Subsection (a) of section 1232 of
 15 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
 16 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2488) is amended
 17 by striking “or 2021” and inserting “2021, or 2022”.

18 (b) WAIVER.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is
 19 amended to read as follows:

20 “(2) not later than 15 days before the date on
 21 which the waiver takes effect, and every 90 days
 22 thereafter, submits to the appropriate congressional
 23 committees—

24 “(A) a notification that the waiver is in the
 25 national security interest of the United States

1 and a description of the national security inter-
2 est covered by the waiver during the applicable
3 reporting period;

4 “(B) a description of any condition or pre-
5 requisite placed by Russia on military coopera-
6 tion between the United States and Russia;

7 “(C) a description of the results achieved
8 by United States-Russia military cooperation
9 during the applicable reporting period and an
10 assessment of whether such results meet the
11 national security objectives described under
12 subparagraph (A);

13 “(D) a description of the measures in place
14 to mitigate counterintelligence or operational
15 security concerns and an assessment of whether
16 such measures have succeeded, submitted in
17 classified form as necessary; and

18 “(E) a report, submitted in classified form
19 as necessary, explaining why the Secretary of
20 Defense cannot make the certification under
21 subsection (a).”.

1 **TITLE** **II—BOLSTERING**
2 **UKRAINE’S DETERRENCE**
3 **AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRES-**
4 **SION**

5 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**
6 **DEFINED.**

7 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional
8 committees” means—

- 9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
10 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
12 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
13 resentatives.

14 **SEC. 202. AMENDMENT TO PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN AU-**
15 **THORITY.**

16 The authority under section 506(a) of the Foreign
17 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) may be exer-
18 cised during fiscal year 2022 for Ukraine to the maximum
19 extent available for that fiscal year, without diminishing
20 the dollar limitation available under that section for such
21 fiscal year.

22 **SEC. 203. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.**

23 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State
25 for fiscal year 2022 \$450,000,000 for Foreign Military Fi-

1 nancing (FMF) assistance to Ukraine to assist the coun-
2 try in meeting its defense needs.

3 (b) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 15 days
4 before providing assistance or support pursuant to sub-
5 section (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
6 propriate congressional committees and the Committees
7 on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Rep-
8 resentatives a notification containing the following:

9 (1) A detailed description of the assistance or
10 support to be provided, including—

11 (A) the objectives of such assistance or
12 support;

13 (B) the budget for such assistance or sup-
14 port; and

15 (C) the expected or estimated timeline for
16 delivery of such assistance or support.

17 (2) A description of such other matters as the
18 Secretary considers appropriate.

19 (c) PRIORITIZATION.—Of the funds authorized to be
20 appropriated under this section, \$200,000,000 shall be set
21 aside to—

22 (1) prioritize the development of Ukrainian air
23 defense capabilities, to include weapons systems;

24 (2) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the
25 Ukrainian Navy and other articles that bolster the

1 capacity of the Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian
2 maritime aggression and maintain the freedom of in-
3 nocent passage throughout the Black Sea; and

4 (3) ensure adequate planning for maintenance
5 for any equipment provided.

6 (d) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LETHAL ASSIST-
7 ANCE.—The Secretary of State is authorized to provide
8 lethal assistance under this section, including anti-armor
9 weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and am-
10 munition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank
11 weapons systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft
12 weapons systems, and small arms and ammunition.

13 **SEC. 204. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANS-**
14 **FER PROGRAM.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—During fiscal years 2022 through
16 2026, the delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine
17 shall be given the same priority as that given other coun-
18 tries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign
19 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

20 (b) NOTIFICATION.—Notwithstanding section 516(f)
21 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
22 2321j(f)), during fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the de-
23 livery of excess defense articles to Ukraine shall be subject
24 to a 15-day notification requirement.

1 **SEC. 205. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM**
2 **ALLIES.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
5 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
6 to the appropriate congressional committees a classified
7 strategy on how the United States will encourage, reim-
8 burse, or otherwise incentivize third countries to donate
9 excess defense equipment to Ukraine.

10 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
11 section (a) shall include the following elements:

12 (1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations
13 that have excess defense material that may be com-
14 patible with the needs and systems utilized by the
15 Armed Forces of Ukraine, including air defense sys-
16 tems, small arms and ammunition, artillery and
17 multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-ship systems,
18 and anti-tank systems.

19 (2) A description of the diplomatic efforts un-
20 dertaken by the United States Government to en-
21 courage, reimburse, or otherwise incentivize allied
22 and partner nations to donate their excess defense
23 articles to Ukraine on an expedited basis.

1 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON UKRAINIAN CAPABILITIES TO**
2 **COUNTER AIR-BASED THREATS.**

3 (a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 30 days
4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
5 of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit
6 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
7 the capabilities of Ukraine to counter air-based threats.

8 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report submitted under sub-
9 section (a) shall include the following elements:

10 (1) An assessment of the risk to the armed
11 forces of Ukraine posed by aerial threats, including
12 current threats from weaponized unmanned aerial
13 vehicles, manned aircraft, and missile and rocket at-
14 tacks.

15 (2) An assessment of the current defensive ca-
16 pabilities of Ukraine to counter the threats described
17 in paragraph (1) and assessed gaps in capabilities to
18 address such threats.

19 (3) A description of current efforts to build the
20 defensive capabilities of Ukraine, an assessment of
21 potential options for additional United States secu-
22 rity assistance to address shortfalls identified pursu-
23 ant to paragraph (2), and any considerations with
24 regard to absorption capacity, maintenance, and
25 sustainment.

1 **SEC. 207. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND**
2 **TRAINING COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.**

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
4 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
5 \$4,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
6 for International Military Education and Training
7 (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be
8 made available for the following purposes:

9 (1) Training of future leaders.

10 (2) Fostering a better understanding of the
11 United States.

12 (3) Establishing a rapport between the United
13 States Armed Forces, regional allies and partners,
14 and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the
15 future.

16 (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa-
17 bilities for joint operations.

18 (5) Focusing on professional military education,
19 civilian control of the military, and human rights.

20 (b) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 15 days
21 before providing assistance or support pursuant to sub-
22 section (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the
23 Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
24 Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
25 eign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the

1 House of Representatives a notification containing the fol-
2 lowing elements:

3 (1) A detailed description of the assistance or
4 support to be provided, including—

5 (A) the objectives of such assistance or
6 support;

7 (B) the budget for such assistance or sup-
8 port; and

9 (C) the expected or estimated timeline for
10 delivery of such assistance or support.

11 (2) A description of such other matters as the
12 Secretary considers appropriate.

13 **SEC. 208. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize
16 the United States IMET program, encourage eligible offi-
17 cers and civilian leaders to participate in the training, and
18 promote successful graduates to positions of prominence
19 in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

20 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
23 a strategy for the implementation of the IMET program
24 in Ukraine authorized under section 207.

1 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
2 section (a) shall include the following elements:

3 (1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation
4 with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the
5 Armed Forces of Ukraine, for how the IMET pro-
6 gram will be used by the United States Government
7 and the Government of Ukraine to propel program
8 graduates to positions of prominence in support of
9 the Ukrainian military’s reform efforts in line with
10 NATO standards.

11 (2) An assessment of the education and train-
12 ing requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear
13 recommendations for how IMET graduates should
14 be assigned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
15 upon completion of education or training.

16 (3) An accounting of the current combat re-
17 quirements of the Ukrainian military and an assess-
18 ment of the viability of alternative mobile training
19 teams, distributed learning, and other flexible solu-
20 tions to reach such students.

21 (4) An identification of opportunities to influ-
22 ence the next generation of leaders through attend-
23 ance at United States staff and war colleges, junior
24 leader development programs, and technical schools.

1 (d) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection
2 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may con-
3 tain a classified annex.

4 **SEC. 209. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) as appropriate, the United States Govern-
7 ment should provide direct loans to Ukraine for the
8 procurement of defense articles, defense services,
9 and design and construction services pursuant to the
10 authority of section 23 of the Arms Export Control
11 Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further devel-
12 opment of Ukraine’s military forces; and

13 (2) such loans should be considered an additive
14 security assistance tool, and not a substitute for
15 Foreign Military Financing for grant assistance or
16 Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative programming.

17 **SEC. 210. UNITED STATES-UKRAINE STRATEGIC SECURITY**
18 **PARTNERSHIP.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that—

21 (1) expeditious consideration of certifications of
22 letters of offer to sell defense articles, defense serv-
23 ices, design and construction services, and major de-
24 fense equipment to Ukraine under section 36(b) of
25 the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(b))

1 is in the security and foreign policy interests of the
2 United States; and

3 (2) the designation of Ukraine as a member of
4 the colloquially titled “NATO Plus” community of
5 states, which presently includes Japan, Australia,
6 the Republic of Korea, Israel, and New Zealand,
7 with respect to consideration by Congress of Foreign
8 Military Sales to Ukraine, as well as all other rights,
9 privileges, and responsibilities afforded to such com-
10 munity of states, is in the security and foreign policy
11 interests of the United States.

12 (b) APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PROVI-
13 SIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO UKRAINE.—During the
14 5-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of
15 this Act, in furtherance of the United States support for
16 Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, including through work to-
17 wards a Membership Action Plan, or until Ukraine depos-
18 its its instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Trea-
19 ty with the Department of State in Washington, DC,
20 Ukraine shall be treated as if it were a country listed in
21 the provisions of law described in subsection (c) for pur-
22 poses of applying and administering such provisions of
23 law.

24 (c) PROVISIONS OF LAW DESCRIBED.—The provi-
25 sions of law described in this subsection are—

1 (1) subsections (b)(2), (d)(2)(B), (d)(3)(A)(i),
2 and (d)(5) of section 3 of the Arms Export Control
3 Act (22 U.S.C. 2753);

4 (2) subsections (e)(2)(A), (h)(1)(A), and (h)(2)
5 of section 21 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2761);

6 (3) subsection (b)(1) and subsections (b)(2),
7 (b)(6), (c)(2)(A), (c)(5), and (d)(2)(A) of section 36
8 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2776);

9 (4) section 62(c)(1) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
10 2796a(c)(1)); and

11 (5) section 63(a)(2) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
12 2796b(a)(2)).

13 (d) CONTINUED APPLICATION.—The Secretary of
14 State is authorized to continue to treat Ukraine as if it
15 were a country listed in the provisions of law described
16 in subsection (c) for purposes of applying and admin-
17 istering such provisions of law for one or more additional
18 3-year periods, or until Ukraine deposits its instrument
19 of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the Depart-
20 ment of State in Washington, DC, beginning after the end
21 of the 5-year period described in subsection (b) if, with
22 respect to each such additional 3-year period, the Sec-
23 retary—

1 (1) determines that such continued application
2 is in the national security interest of the United
3 States;

4 (2) determines that such continued application
5 is carried out alongside United States support for
6 Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, including through
7 work towards a Membership Action Plan; and

8 (3) submits such determination to the Com-
9 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
10 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
11 tions of the Senate not later than 15 days before the
12 start of such an additional 3-year period.

13 (e) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on
14 the date on which Ukraine deposits its instrument of ac-
15 cession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the Department
16 of State in Washington, DC.

17 **SEC. 211. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE’S DEFENSE IN-**
18 **DUSTRY FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITORS.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that the United States should work with the Govern-
21 ment of Ukraine to ensure strategic assets and companies
22 in Ukraine’s aerospace and defense sector are not subject
23 to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by stra-
24 tegic competitors to the United States, such as the Peo-
25 ple’s Republic of China (PRC). These efforts will require

1 support from across the Executive Branch and should le-
2 verage all available tools and authorities.

3 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President,
6 acting through the Secretary of Defense and the
7 Secretary of State and in consultation with the
8 heads of other relevant Departments and agencies as
9 the President may determine, shall submit to the ap-
10 propriate committees of Congress a strategy to sup-
11 port Ukraine in protecting its aerospace and defense
12 industry from predatory investments.

13 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
14 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

15 (A) An assessment of the efforts by stra-
16 tegic competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire
17 strategic assets and companies in Ukraine’s
18 aerospace and defense sector and the national
19 security implications for Ukraine, the United
20 States, and other NATO allies and partners.

21 (B) An assessment of the vulnerabilities
22 that strategic competitors of the United States
23 exploit to acquire strategic assets in the
24 Ukrainian aerospace and defense sector,
25 Ukraine’s progress in addressing them, and

1 United States initiatives to support these ef-
2 forts such as assistance in strengthening
3 Ukraine’s investment screening and national se-
4 curity vetting laws.

5 (C) An assessment of Ukraine’s efforts to
6 make reforms necessary to incentivize Western
7 investment in Ukraine’s aerospace and defense
8 sector and United States support for these ef-
9 forts.

10 (D) A strategy to—

11 (i) promote, as appropriate, United
12 States direct investment in Ukraine’s aero-
13 space and defense sector;

14 (ii) better leverage tools like debt fi-
15 nancing, equity investments, and political
16 risk insurance to incentivize greater par-
17 ticipation by United States firms;

18 (iii) provide an alternative to PRC in-
19 vestments; and

20 (iv) engage like-minded allies and
21 partners on these efforts.

22 (3) FORM.—The strategy required under para-
23 graph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

1 **SEC. 212. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
3 priated to the Department of State \$50,000,000 for each
4 of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes
5 described in subsection (b) with respect to Ukraine.

6 (b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursu-
7 ant to subsection (a) may only be used—

8 (1) to strengthen Ukraine’s cyber security,
9 cyber resilience and intellectual property enforce-
10 ment;

11 (2) to provide support and training in Ukraine
12 for—

13 (A) sectoral reforms related to banking
14 and public finance management reform;

15 (B) the privatization of state-owned enter-
16 prises;

17 (C) regulatory independence;

18 (D) subsidy reform;

19 (E) land reform;

20 (F) corporate governance; and

21 (G) foreign investment screening;

22 (3) to combat corruption, improve the rule of
23 law, and otherwise strengthen independent legal in-
24 stitutions, including by—

25 (A) expanding regional anti-corruption
26 training and exchanges among Ukrainian Min-

1 istry officials, law enforcement officers, judges,
2 and prosecutors to build peer support, share
3 best practices, maintain reform momentum, and
4 protect reforms from capture; and

5 (B) supporting regional training of United
6 States Embassy personnel responsible for sup-
7 porting anti-corruption and the rule of law to
8 improve their effectiveness in supporting the
9 consolidation and expansion of reform;

10 (4) to respond to the humanitarian crises
11 caused or aggravated by the invasion and occupation
12 of Ukraine by Russia, including by supporting inter-
13 nally displaced persons and communities in conflict-
14 affected areas;

15 (5) to improve participatory legislative proc-
16 esses in Ukraine, including through—

17 (A) engagement with members of the
18 Verkhovna Rada;

19 (B) training on government oversight, legal
20 education, political transparency and competi-
21 tion, and compliance with international obliga-
22 tions; and

23 (C) supporting the development of profes-
24 sional legislative staff to advise and assist mem-
25 ber of the Verkhovna Rada and committees in

1 the execution of their duties and build legal and
 2 policy expertise within the Verkhovna Rada;
 3 and

4 (6) to further build the capacity of civil society,
 5 independent media, human rights, and other non-
 6 governmental organizations in Ukraine, with an em-
 7 phasis on—

8 (A) building capacity outside of Kyiv; and

9 (B) regional civil society training and ex-
 10 change programs.

11 **SEC. 213. EXPANDED BROADCASTING IN COUNTRIES OF**
 12 **THE FORMER SOVIET UNION TO COMBAT**
 13 **RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND INFORMA-**
 14 **TION OPERATIONS.**

15 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
 16 are authorized to be appropriated to the U.S. Agency for
 17 Global Media \$155,500,000 for fiscal year 2022 for pur-
 18 poses of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty expanded
 19 broadcasting in countries of the former Soviet Union to
 20 combat Russian disinformation and information oper-
 21 ations.

22 (b) **PRIORITIZATION OF BROADCASTING INTO**
 23 **UKRAINE, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS.**—Amount
 24 appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall prioritize
 25 broadcasting to Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova.

1 **SEC. 214. STRATEGY ON INCLE PROGRAMMING IN**
2 **UKRAINE.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize
5 the United States International Narcotics Control and
6 Law Enforcement (INCLE) program, to continue to sup-
7 port the Ministry of the Interior and the Security Service,
8 and the Public Prosecution Service of Ukraine.

9 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
11 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
12 a strategy for the implementation of the INCLE program
13 in Ukraine.

14 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
15 section (a) shall include the following elements:

16 (1) A plan for the INCLE program in Ukraine
17 to enhance the capacity of the National Anti-Corrup-
18 tion Bureau of Ukraine, the Specialized Anti-Cor-
19 ruption Prosecutor's Office and the High Anti-Cor-
20 ruption Court, as well as other institutions and min-
21 istries involved in conducting prosecutorial reform
22 efforts, investigating allegations of corruption, pros-
23 ecuting individuals engaged in corrupt practices, and
24 transnational organized criminal activities.

25 (2) An accounting of fiscal year 2020 and fiscal
26 year 2021 INCLE spending and an evaluation of the

1 program implementation identifying Ukrainian part-
2 ners, implementers, and unexpended assistance from
3 these fiscal years and prior fiscal years that remain
4 unexpended.

5 (d) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection
6 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, and may be
7 accompanied by a classified annex.

8 **SEC. 215. STRATEGY FOR COOPERATION ON INTER-**
9 **MEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND**
10 **SYSTEMS TO NATO ALLIES.**

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

12 (1) All NATO allies agree that the SSC-8/
13 9M729 missile system developed and deployed by the
14 Government of Russia violated the Intermediate-
15 Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (in this section re-
16 ferred to as the “INF Treaty”), while posing a sig-
17 nificant risk to NATO security.

18 (2) Despite NATO allies’ repeated calls on the
19 Government of Russia to return to full and verifiable
20 compliance with the INF Treaty, Russia continued
21 to develop and deploy INF Treaty-violating systems,
22 which led to the INF Treaty’s demise on August 2,
23 2019.

24 (3) As of the INF Treaty’s demise, Russia had
25 produced and deployed multiple battalions of INF

1 Treaty-violating missiles, capable of reaching key
2 European capitals and targets.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—A mutual deployment
4 moratorium in the European theater with the Russian
5 Federation is not in the interest of the United States.
6 Even if a European-Theater intermediate-range ground-
7 launched missile deployment moratorium were verifiable,
8 any such moratorium would significantly advantage Rus-
9 sia and disadvantage NATO. This is due to the Russian
10 Federation's continual threats of aggression against sov-
11 ereign European nations, the relative ease by which Russia
12 could deploy such systems to the theater, and the logistical
13 impediments with which the United States and NATO
14 would have to contend should it be determined a commen-
15 surate response was warranted.

16 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
18 and the Secretary of State shall jointly develop a strategy
19 to cooperate with willing NATO member countries in the
20 joint research, development, training and possible transfer
21 of conventional intermediate-range ground-launched mis-
22 siles, associated launchers and support equipment, and as-
23 sociated technology.

1 **TITLE III—SECURING UKRAINE**
2 **AGAINST RUSSIA’S USE OF**
3 **ENERGY AS A WEAPON**

4 **SEC. 301. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
5 **NORD STREAM 2.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after the
7 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

8 (1) impose sanctions under subsection (b) with
9 respect to any corporate officer of an entity estab-
10 lished for or responsible for the planning, construc-
11 tion, or operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline or
12 a successor entity; and

13 (2) impose sanctions under subsection (c) with
14 respect to any entity described in paragraph (1).

15 (b) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PA-
16 ROLE OF IDENTIFIED PERSONS AND CORPORATE OFFI-
17 CERS.—

18 (1) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien
19 described in subsection (a)(1) is—

20 (A) inadmissible to the United States;

21 (B) ineligible to receive a visa or other doc-
22 umentation to enter the United States; and

23 (C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or
24 paroled into the United States or to receive any

1 other benefit under the Immigration and Na-
2 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

3 (2) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other entry
5 documentation of an alien described in sub-
6 section (a)(1) shall be revoked, regardless of
7 when such visa or other entry documentation is
8 or was issued.

9 (B) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation
10 under clause (i) shall—

11 (i) take effect immediately; and

12 (ii) automatically cancel any other
13 valid visa or entry documentation that is in
14 the alien's possession.

15 (c) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF IDENTIFIED PER-
16 SONS.—The President shall exercise all powers granted to
17 the President by the International Emergency Economic
18 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent nec-
19 essary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property
20 and interests in property of an entity described in sub-
21 section (a)(1) if such property and interests in property
22 are in the United States, come within the United States,
23 or are or come within the possession or control of a United
24 States person.

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

1 (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE AND LAW
2 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this
3 section shall not apply with respect to law enforce-
4 ment activities, activities subject to the reporting re-
5 quirements under title V of the National Security
6 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 2091 et seq.) or any author-
7 ized intelligence activities of the United States.

8 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-
9 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions
10 under this section shall not apply with respect to the
11 admission of an alien to the United States if the ad-
12 mission of the alien is necessary to permit the
13 United States to comply with the Agreement regard-
14 ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed
15 at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into
16 force November 21, 1947, between the United Na-
17 tions and the United States, the Convention on Con-
18 sular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and
19 entered into force March 19, 1967, or other applica-
20 ble international obligations.

21 (e) CONDITIONS FOR REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),
23 the President may waive the application of sanctions
24 under this section if the President—

1 (A) determines that the waiver is in the
2 national security interest of the United States;
3 and

4 (B) submits to the appropriate committees
5 of Congress a report on the waiver and the rea-
6 son for the waiver.

7 (2) CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.—The provisions
8 of subsections (b) and (c) of section 216 of the
9 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc-
10 tions Act (22 U.S.C. 9511) shall apply with respect
11 to a waiver of the application of sanctions under this
12 section to the same extent and in the same manner
13 as such provisions apply with respect to a proposed
14 action described in subsection (a) of section 216 of
15 such Act.

16 (f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

17 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
18 ercise all authorities provided to the President under
19 sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer-
20 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
21 1704) to carry out this section.

22 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
23 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
24 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
25 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject

1 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)
2 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-
3 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-
4 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
5 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

6 (g) SUNSET.—The authority to impose sanctions
7 under this section shall terminate on the date that is 5
8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

9 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

10 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
11 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the
12 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
13 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

14 (2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
15 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
16 gress” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
18 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
19 Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
21 the Committee on Financial Services of the
22 House of Representatives.

23 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
24 “United States person” means—

1 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
 2 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
 3 United States;

4 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
 5 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
 6 United States, including a foreign branch of
 7 such an entity; or

8 (C) any person within the United States.

9 **SEC. 302. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF WAIVER UNDER**
 10 **PROTECTING EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY**
 11 **ACT OF 2019.**

12 Section 7503(f) of the Protecting Europe’s Energy
 13 Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116–
 14 92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note) is amended to read as follows:

15 “(f) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—

16 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),
 17 the President may waive the application of sanctions
 18 under this section with respect to a person if the
 19 President—

20 “(A) determines that the waiver is in the
 21 national interests of the United States; and

22 “(B) submits to the appropriate congres-
 23 sional committees a report on the waiver and
 24 the reasons for the waiver.

1 “(2) CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.—The provisions
 2 of subsections (b) and (c) of section 216 of the
 3 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc-
 4 tions Act (22 U.S.C. 9511) shall apply with respect
 5 to a waiver of the application of sanctions under this
 6 section to the same extent and in the same manner
 7 as such provisions apply with respect to a proposed
 8 action described in subsection (a) of section 216 of
 9 such Act.”.

10 **SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW**
 11 **UNDER COUNTERING AMERICA’S ADVER-**
 12 **SARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT.**

13 Section 216(a)(2) of the Countering America’s Ad-
 14 versaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9511(a)(2))
 15 is amended—

16 (1) in subparagraph (A)—

17 (A) in clause (i), by inserting “(other than
 18 sanctions described in clause (i)(IV) of that
 19 subparagraph)” after “subparagraph (B)”; and

20 (B) in clause (ii), by inserting “or other-
 21 wise remove” after “waive”; and

22 (2) in subparagraph (B)(i)—

23 (A) in subclause (II), by striking “; or”
 24 and inserting a semicolon;

1 (B) in subclause (III), by striking “; and”
 2 and inserting a semicolon; and

3 (C) by adding at the end the following:

4 “(IV) Executive Order No.
 5 14024 (86 Fed. Reg. 20249; relating
 6 to Blocking Property With Respect To
 7 Specified Harmful Foreign Activities
 8 of the Government of the Russian
 9 Federation);

10 “(V) section 7503 of the Pro-
 11 tecting Europe’s Energy Security Act
 12 of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law
 13 116–92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note); or

14 “(VI) section 301 of the Guar-
 15 anteeing Ukrainian Autonomy by Rein-
 16 forcing its Defense (GUARD) Act of
 17 2022.”.

18 **SEC. 304. CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY**
 19 **CONGRESS IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS.**

20 Not later than 90 days after receiving a written re-
 21 quest from the chairperson and ranking member of the
 22 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
 23 tives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
 24 with respect to whether a foreign person or entity has en-
 25 gaged in an activity described in section 1 of Executive

1 Order No. 14024 (86 Fed. Reg. 20249; relating to Block-
2 ing Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign
3 Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation),
4 the President shall—

5 (1) determine if that person has engaged in
6 such an activity; and

7 (2) submit a report to the chairperson and
8 ranking member of that committee with respect to
9 that determination that includes—

10 (A) a statement of whether or not the
11 President imposed or intends to impose sanc-
12 tions with respect to the person; and

13 (B) if the President imposed or intends to
14 impose sanctions, a description of those sanc-
15 tions.

16 **SEC. 305. INCLUSION OF MATTER RELATING TO NORD**
17 **STREAM 2 IN REPORT UNDER COUNTERING**
18 **AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANC-**
19 **TIONS ACT.**

20 Each report submitted under section 216(a)(1) of the
21 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
22 (22 U.S.C. 9511(a)(1)) relating to sanctions under section
23 301 of this Act or section 7503 of the Protecting Europe's
24 Energy Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law
25 116–92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note) shall include—

1 (1) an assessment of the security risks posed by
2 Nord Stream 2, including—

3 (A) the presence along Nord Stream 2 or
4 Nord Stream 1 infrastructure or pipeline cor-
5 ridors of undersea surveillance systems and sen-
6 sors, fiber optic terminals, or other systems
7 that are capable of conducting military or intel-
8 ligence activities unrelated to civilian energy
9 transmission, including those designed to en-
10 hance Russian anti-submarine warfare, surveil-
11 lance, espionage, or sabotage capabilities;

12 (B) the use of Nord Stream-affiliated in-
13 frastructure, equipment, personnel, vessels, fi-
14 nancing, or other assets—

15 (i) to facilitate, carry out, or conceal
16 Russian maritime surveillance, espionage,
17 or sabotage activities;

18 (ii) to justify the presence of Russian
19 naval vessels or military personnel or
20 equipment in international waters or near
21 North Atlantic Treaty Organization or
22 partner countries;

23 (iii) to disrupt freedom of navigation;

24 or

1 (iv) to pressure or intimidate coun-
2 tries in the Baltic Sea;

3 (C) the involvement in the Nord Stream 2
4 pipeline or its affiliated entities of current or
5 former Russian, Soviet, or Warsaw Pact intel-
6 ligence and military personnel and any business
7 dealings between Nord Stream 2 and entities
8 affiliated with the intelligence or defense sector
9 of Russia; and

10 (D) malign influence activities of the Gov-
11 ernment of Russia, including strategic corrup-
12 tion and efforts to influence European decision-
13 makers, supported or financed through the
14 Nord Stream 2 pipeline;

15 (2) an assessment of whether Russia maintains
16 gas transit through Ukraine at levels consistent with
17 the volumes set forth in the Ukraine-Russia gas
18 transit agreement of December 2019 and continues
19 to pay the transit fees specified in that agreement;

20 (3) an assessment of the status of negotiations
21 between Russia and Ukraine to secure an agreement
22 to extend gas transit through Ukraine beyond the
23 expiration of the agreement described in paragraph
24 (2);

1 (4) an assessment of whether the United States
2 and Germany have agreed on a common definition
3 for energy “weaponization” and the associated trig-
4 gers for sanctions and other enforcement actions,
5 pursuant to the Joint Statement of the United
6 States and Germany on support for Ukraine, Euro-
7 pean energy security, and our climate goals, dated
8 July 21, 2021; and

9 (5) a description of the consultations with
10 United States allies and partners in Europe, includ-
11 ing Ukraine, Poland, and the countries in Central
12 and Eastern Europe most impacted by the Nord
13 Stream 2 pipeline concerning the matters agreed to,
14 as described in paragraph (4).

15 **SEC. 306. UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
17 priated \$50,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Ukraine
18 Security Assistance Initiative for the purpose of providing
19 lethal aid assistance.

20 (b) AMOUNTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER AVAILABLE
21 AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to sub-
22 section (a) are in addition to any other amounts appro-
23 priated or otherwise made available for such fiscal year
24 for such purposes.

1 **SEC. 307. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**

2 **DEFINED.**

3 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional
4 committees” means—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
6 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
8 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
9 resentatives.

○