

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 3142

To establish the Interagency United States-Based Terrorism Threat
Information Sharing Commission, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 19, 2019

Ms. HASSAN (for herself and Mr. JOHNSON) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To establish the Interagency United States-Based Terrorism
Threat Information Sharing Commission, and for other
purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Increasing Efficiency
5 of All United States-Based Terrorism Information Shar-
6 ing Act of 2019”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) Eighteen years after September 11, 2001,
10 the Federal Government needs to reevaluate its

1 counterterrorism information sharing architecture in
2 the United States to support the ability of Federal,
3 State, and local law enforcement to identify, track,
4 and prevent all terrorist threats in the United
5 States.

6 (2) The current National Strategy for Counter-
7 terrorism states that incidents of domestic terrorism
8 in the United States are on the rise, perpetrated by
9 individuals not inspired by foreign terrorist organi-
10 zations but instead by other forms of terrorism in
11 the United States (sometimes as referred to as “do-
12 mestic terrorists” by the executive branch), and indi-
13 viduals inspired by foreign terrorist organizations re-
14 main a persistent threat.

15 (3) Furthermore, the terrorist threat in the
16 United States is increasingly diffuse and unpredict-
17 able, primarily conducted by lone actors who are mo-
18 tivated or inspired by a range of violent ideologies.
19 Lone actors are able to operate with little to no
20 warning and present significant challenges to law
21 enforcement and security officials working to iden-
22 tify and disrupt potential threats. Robust and com-
23 prehensive information sharing regarding all ter-
24 rorist threats in the United States, irrespective of

1 inspiration, is key to our ability to prevent attacks
2 and save lives.

3 (4) Lastly, increasing distribution and stand-
4 ardization of Federal terrorism training that reflects
5 all types of United States-based terrorism threats is
6 critical to support Federal, State, and local law en-
7 forcement’s ability to keep all of our communities
8 safe.

9 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

10 In this Act:

11 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
12 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
13 gress” includes the following:

14 (A) The Committee on the Judiciary, the
15 Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
16 mental Affairs, and the Select Committee on
17 Intelligence of the Senate.

18 (B) The Committee on the Judiciary, the
19 Committee on Homeland Security, and the Per-
20 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
21 House of Representatives.

22 (2) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission”
23 means the Interagency United States-Based Ter-
24 rorism Information Sharing Commission established
25 under section 4(a)(1).

1 (3) DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—The term “domes-
 2 tic terrorism” has the meaning given such term in
 3 section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.

4 (4) FIELD OFFICE.—The term “field office”
 5 means one of the field offices of the Federal Bureau
 6 of Investigation (also known as “divisions”) that are
 7 centrally located in major metropolitan areas across
 8 the United States, including Puerto Rico, where the
 9 Bureau—

10 (A) carries out investigations;

11 (B) assesses local and regional crime
 12 threats; and

13 (C) works closely with partners on cases
 14 and operations.

15 (5) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The
 16 term “foreign terrorist organization” means an or-
 17 ganization designated as a terrorist organization
 18 under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Na-
 19 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).

20 (6) FUSION CENTER.—The term “fusion cen-
 21 ter” has the meaning given such term in section
 22 210A(j) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
 23 U.S.C. 124h(j)).

24 (7) JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE.—The term
 25 “ joint terrorism task force” means one of the task

1 forces of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that
2 are—

3 (A) located throughout United States;

4 (B) partnerships between various Federal,
5 State, and local law enforcement and intel-
6 ligence agencies; and

7 (C) charged with taking action against ter-
8 rorism.

9 **SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY UNITED**
10 **STATES-BASED TERRORISM THREAT INFOR-**
11 **MATION SHARING COMMISSION.**

12 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
15 of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with
16 the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of
17 the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Attor-
18 ney General, establish a commission to review inter-
19 agency information sharing with respect to all forms
20 of terrorist threats in the United States to examine
21 the terrorist threat information sharing landscape
22 across and between all levels of government and the
23 manner in which different types of terrorism affects
24 information sharing.

1 (2) DESIGNATION.—The commission estab-
2 lished under paragraph (1) shall be known as the
3 “Interagency United States-Based Terrorism Threat
4 Information Sharing Commission”.

5 (b) MEMBERSHIP.—

6 (1) COMPOSITION.—Subject to paragraph (2),
7 the Commission shall be composed of not more than
8 28 members as follows:

9 (A) The Director of National Intelligence
10 shall appoint to the Commission not more than
11 7 members as follows:

12 (i) At least 1 member shall be selected
13 from among employees of the Office of the
14 Program Manager for the Information
15 Sharing Environment.

16 (ii) At least 1 member shall be se-
17 lected from among employees of the Direc-
18 torate of Strategic Operational Planning in
19 the National Counterterrorism Center.

20 (iii) Acting through the head of the
21 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team
22 in the National Counterterrorism Center,
23 at least 1 member shall be selected from
24 among members of a State or local law en-
25 forcement agency.

1 (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security
2 shall appoint to the Commission not more than
3 7 members as follows:

4 (i) At least 1 member shall be selected
5 from among employees of the Office of
6 Strategy, Policy, and Plans of the Depart-
7 ment of Homeland Security.

8 (ii) At least 3 members shall be se-
9 lected from a fusion center—

10 (I) at least 1 of whom shall be
11 based out of a recognized regional fu-
12 sion center;

13 (II) at least 1 of whom shall be
14 based out of a designated State fusion
15 center in a State that the Secretary
16 considers small or rural; and

17 (III) at least 1 of whom shall be
18 based out of a designated State fusion
19 center in a State that has 2 or more
20 recognized fusion centers.

21 (C) The Attorney General shall appoint to
22 the Commission not more than 7 members as
23 follows:

24 (i) At least 1 member shall be selected
25 from among employees of the National Se-

1 security Division of the Department of Jus-
2 tice.

3 (ii) At least 1 member shall be se-
4 lected from among employees of the Civil
5 Rights Division of the Department of Jus-
6 tice.

7 (iii) At least 2 members shall be se-
8 lected from among employees of an office
9 of a United States Attorney—

10 (I) at least 1 of whom shall be
11 based out of a State that the Attorney
12 General considers large or urban; and

13 (II) at least 1 of whom shall be
14 based out of a State that the Attorney
15 General considers small or rural.

16 (D) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
17 Investigation shall appoint not more than 7
18 members as follows:

19 (i) At least 1 of whom shall be se-
20 lected from among employees of the Do-
21 mestic Terrorism Operations Section of the
22 Bureau.

23 (ii) At least 1 member shall be se-
24 lected from among employees of the Crimi-
25 nal Investigative Division of the Bureau.

(iii) At least 2 members shall be selected from among members of a joint terrorism task force—

(I) at least 1 of whom shall be a member of a local law enforcement agency in a city of the United States the Director considers large or urban; and

(II) at least 1 of whom shall be a member of a local law enforcement agency in a city of the United States the Director considers small or rural.

(2) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) NO POLITICAL APPOINTEES.—No member of the Commission may be a political appointee.

(B) EMPLOYMENT STATUS.—Each member of the Commission shall be—

(i) an employee of the Federal Government in the executive branch;

(ii) an individual who has been detailed to the executive branch of the Federal Government; or

(iii) an individual who is a member of a State or local law enforcement agency.

1 (c) COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National In-
3 telligence shall select a chairperson from among
4 members of the Commission who are senior officers
5 of the National Counterterrorism Center.

6 (2) DUTIES OF THE CHAIRPERSON.—The chair-
7 person appointed under paragraph (1) shall—

8 (A) lead the interagency process to prepare
9 the report required by section 5(b)(1);

10 (B) arbitrate difference among those in-
11 volved in preparing the report required by sec-
12 tion 5(b)(1); and

13 (C) ensure that each Federal agency rep-
14 resented in the membership of the Commis-
15 sion—

16 (i) has equal opportunity for input in
17 matters concerning the Commission; and

18 (ii) will lead efforts under section 5
19 that pertain to matters with respect to
20 which the agency has a statutory mandate.

21 **SEC. 5. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.**

22 (a) REVIEW.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall con-
24 duct a review of threat information sharing de-
25 scribed in section 4(a)(1).

1 (2) ELEMENTS.—The review required by para-
2 graph (1) shall include the following:

3 (A) The assessment described in subpara-
4 graph (A) of subsection (b)(2).

5 (B) Development of the findings described
6 in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such sub-
7 section.

8 (C) Development of the recommendations
9 described in subparagraph (D) of such sub-
10 section.

11 (b) REPORT.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall sub-
13 mit to the Director of National Intelligence, the Sec-
14 retary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General,
15 and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
16 tion a report on the findings of the Commission with
17 respect to the review conducted under subsection
18 (a)(1).

19 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under
20 paragraph (1) shall include the following:

21 (A) ASSESSMENT.—An assessment of cur-
22 rent capabilities, mechanisms, gaps, and chal-
23 lenges regarding nationwide United States-
24 based terrorism threat-information sharing and
25 training.

(B) INFORMATION SHARING FINDINGS.—

Findings on information sharing, including with respect to the following:

(i) BASELINE EXISTING TYPES OF

TERRORISM THREAT INFORMATION.—(I)

What type of information regarding United States-based terrorism threats that are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, and United States-based terrorism threats that are not inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, is currently captured across the Federal, State, and local levels of government, along with information about such terrorism that is likely not captured or is lost at each level.

(II) Types of information under subclause (I) may include cables, situational reports, information reports, assessments, digests, toolboxes, and bulletins.

(III) With respect to information described in subclause (I)—

(aa) a comparison and noted differences between both types of information regarding threats of United

1 States-based terrorism not inspired by
2 foreign terrorist organizations and in-
3 spired by foreign terrorist organiza-
4 tions; and

5 (bb) any gaps and challenges to
6 addressing such differences.

7 (IV) The types of information cap-
8 tured at each level described in subclause
9 (I) while possibly labeled as other criminal
10 acts that could be relevant to threats of
11 terrorism not inspired by United States-
12 based foreign terrorist organizations, in-
13 cluding relevant intelligence, reporting, and
14 assessments.

15 (V) The effect of how different levels
16 of classified information affect the types of
17 threat information captured.

18 (ii) PARTNERS WHO RECEIVE THE IN-
19 FORMATION.—(I) Who receives information
20 regarding threats of United States-based
21 terrorism not inspired by foreign terrorist
22 organizations, and separately who receives
23 information regarding threats of United
24 States-based terrorism inspired by foreign
25 terrorist organizations, as well as those en-

1 tities and partners who do not currently
2 receive this information, including with re-
3 spect to Federal, State, local, and Tribal
4 government partners.

5 (II) With respect to threat informa-
6 tion described in subclause (I)—

7 (aa) a comparison and noted dif-
8 ferences between both information re-
9 garding threats of United States-
10 based terrorism not inspired by for-
11 eign terrorist organizations and in-
12 spired by foreign terrorist organiza-
13 tions; and

14 (bb) any gaps and challenges to
15 addressing such differences.

16 (III) The effect of how different levels
17 of classified information affect the receipt
18 of such information by various partners.

19 (iii) WHAT INFORMATION IS
20 SHARED.—(I) What information regarding
21 United States-based terrorism threats that
22 are inspired by foreign terrorist organiza-
23 tions, or the ideology thereof, and United
24 States-based terrorism threats that are not
25 inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,

1 or the ideology thereof, is currently shared
2 or could be shared with the partners iden-
3 tified under clause (ii), as well as informa-
4 tion the Commission identifies is not being
5 shared.

6 (II) With respect to threat informa-
7 tion described in subclause (I)—

8 (aa) a comparison and noted dif-
9 ferences between both information re-
10 garding threats of United States-
11 based terrorism not inspired by for-
12 eign terrorist organizations and in-
13 spired by foreign terrorist organiza-
14 tions; and

15 (bb) any gaps and challenges to
16 addressing such differences.

17 (III)(aa) An assessment of how infor-
18 mation regarding threats of United States-
19 based terrorism not inspired by foreign ter-
20 rorist organizations according to the Fed-
21 eral Bureau of Investigation's broad pro-
22 gram categories of racially motivated vio-
23 lent extremism, animal and eco violent ex-
24 tremism, antigovernment violent extre-
25 mism, and abortion violent extremism.

1 (bb) Assessment under item (aa) shall
2 be disaggregated by the following:

3 (AA) Types of racially motivated
4 violent extremism, specifically out-
5 lining all threat information relating
6 to both white and black violent extre-
7 mism, and the numerical volume of
8 threat information under each sub-
9 category or subprogram.

10 (BB) Types of antigovernment
11 violent extremism to clearly illustrate
12 all threat information relating to mili-
13 tia, anarchist, and sovereign citizen
14 violent extremism and the numerical
15 volume of threat information under
16 each subcategory or subprogram.

17 (CC) Types of animal and eco
18 violent extremism and the numerical
19 volume of threat information under
20 each subcategory or subprogram.

21 (IV) Expansion of the categorization
22 described in subclause (III) to include cre-
23 ation of a new category for new and
24 emerging threats, such as anti-immigrant

1 violent extremism, and incel violent extre-
 2 mism.

3 (V) Effects of how sharing at dif-
 4 ferent levels of classified information af-
 5 fects what information is available to var-
 6 ious partners.

7 (iv) HOW THREAT INFORMATION IS
 8 SHARED.—(I) How information regarding
 9 United States-based terrorism threats that
 10 are inspired by foreign terrorist organiza-
 11 tions, or the ideology thereof, and United
 12 States-based terrorism threats that are not
 13 inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,
 14 or the ideology thereof, is shared, including
 15 what the existing mechanisms are for shar-
 16 ing with respect to infrastructure or per-
 17 sonnel, disaggregated by—

18 (aa) what types of threat infor-
 19 mation are received;

20 (bb) classification level; and

21 (cc) partner identified under
 22 clause (ii).

23 (II) With respect to information de-
 24 scribed in subclause (I)—

1 (aa) a comparison and noted dif-
2 ferences between both information re-
3 garding threats of United States-
4 based terrorism not inspired by for-
5 eign terrorist organizations and in-
6 spired by foreign terrorist organiza-
7 tions; and

8 (bb) any gaps and challenges to
9 address such differences.

10 (III) Existing mechanisms through
11 which information regarding threats of
12 United States-based terrorism threats that
13 are inspired by foreign terrorist organiza-
14 tions, or the ideology thereof, and United
15 States-based terrorism threats that are not
16 inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,
17 or the ideology thereof, is currently shared
18 within and across the Federal Government
19 with partners identified under clause (ii),
20 including with respect to the following:

21 (aa) Infrastructure, such as
22 Guardian, eGuardian, and the Na-
23 tional Crime Information Center.

24 (bb) Task forces, such as joint
25 terrorism task forces.

1 (cc) Professional staff who per-
2 form information sharing as part as
3 an official duty, such as liaison offi-
4 cers.

5 (dd) Threat information sharing
6 from Federal to State and local part-
7 ners, from local partners to State and
8 Federal partners, and information
9 that is shared laterally between States
10 and between Federal agencies.

11 (ee) Threat information sharing
12 across geographic and interagency
13 lines, departments and agencies, and
14 information systems.

15 (IV) Effects of how sharing at dif-
16 ferent levels of classified information af-
17 fects how threat information is shared with
18 various partners.

19 (v) REDUNDANCIES, GAPS, AND DIF-
20 FERENCES.—(I) Redundancies, gaps, and
21 differences in information sharing regard-
22 ing threats of United States-based ter-
23 rorism threats that are inspired by foreign
24 terrorist organizations, or the ideology
25 thereof, and United States-based terrorism

1 threats that are not inspired by foreign
2 terrorist organizations, or the ideology
3 thereof.

4 (II) Causes of such redundancies,
5 gaps, and differences described in sub-
6 clause (I).

7 (III) Challenges to improvement with
8 respect to sharing described in subclause
9 (I).

10 (IV) How redundancies and gaps de-
11 scribed in subclause (I) differ between
12 United States-based terrorism threats that
13 are inspired by foreign terrorist organiza-
14 tions, or the ideology thereof, and United
15 States-based terrorism threats that are not
16 inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,
17 or the ideology thereof, disaggregated by
18 each category of partner identified under
19 clause (ii).

20 (V) How differences described in sub-
21 clause (IV) relate to challenges concerning
22 classification of threat information.

23 (C) UNITED STATES-BASED TERRORISM
24 TRAINING FINDINGS.—Findings relating to ex-
25 isting Federal training concerning either or a

1 combination of both United States-based ter-
2 rorism threats that are inspired by foreign ter-
3 rorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, or
4 United States-based terrorism threats that are
5 not inspired by foreign terrorist organizations,
6 or the ideology thereof, including the following:

7 (i)(I) What Federal, State, local, and
8 Tribal government training exists regard-
9 ing both United States-based terrorism
10 threats that are inspired by foreign ter-
11 rorist organizations, or the ideology there-
12 of, and United States-based terrorism
13 threats that are not inspired by foreign
14 terrorist organizations, or the ideology
15 thereof, disaggregated by categories and
16 classification differences.

17 (II) With respect to information de-
18 scribed in subclause (I)—

19 (aa) a comparison and noted dif-
20 ferences between both information re-
21 garding threats of United States-
22 based terrorism not inspired by for-
23 eign terrorist organizations and in-
24 spired by foreign terrorist organiza-
25 tions; and

1 (bb) any gaps and challenges to
2 address such differences.

3 (ii) Which partners identified under
4 subparagraph (B)(ii) receive what training
5 with respect to terrorism in the United
6 States.

7 (iii) What are the mechanisms, insti-
8 tutions, and training centers that provide
9 each of such trainings.

10 (iv) An examination of training con-
11 tent, who provides such training, how pro-
12 viders of such training are vetted, how
13 such training is vetted or coordinated
14 among agencies, disaggregated by training
15 concerning United States-based terrorism
16 threats that are inspired by foreign ter-
17 rorist organizations, or the ideology there-
18 of, and United States-based terrorism
19 threats that are not inspired by foreign
20 terrorist organizations, or the ideology
21 thereof.

22 (v) Outlines of training redundancies,
23 gaps, and challenges in distribution, for
24 each type of training, and the impediments
25 to addressing such challenges.

(D) RECOMMENDATIONS.—

(i) THREAT INFORMATION SHARING.—Recommendations to address the differences between information sharing concerning United States-based terrorism threats that are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, and United States-based terrorism threats that are not inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, including recommendations regarding policy, programs, resources, and infrastructure needed to address challenges and gaps indicated in the findings of the Commission. Such recommendations shall include the following:

(I) INFORMATION RECIPIENTS.—

Recommendations to maintain, commence, or expand coordination and threat information sharing among Federal, State, local, and Tribal government agencies and private entities with protective or public safety responsibilities who were identified as needing access to such information,

1 including how gaps should be miti-
2 gated and how current challenges
3 should be addressed.

4 (II) CONTENT.—Recommendations to maintain, commence, or ex-
5 pand the type and categories of threat
6 information given to each of the Fed-
7 eral, State, local, and Tribal govern-
8 ment agencies and private entities de-
9 scribed in subclause (I).

11 (III) MECHANISMS.—Recommendations relating to the most ef-
12 fective use of existing Federal, State,
13 local, and Tribal mechanisms for cap-
14 turing and sharing relevant threat in-
15 formation, including—

17 (aa) how gaps should be
18 mitigated;

19 (bb) how current challenges
20 should be addressed; and

21 (cc) proposals for new or ex-
22 panded mechanisms.

23 (IV) ELIMINATING REDUN-
24 DANCY.—Recommendations to elimi-
25 nate redundancy regarding who re-

1 ceives threat information, what infor-
2 mation is shared, mechanisms for how
3 information is shared, including rec-
4 ommendations to address the implica-
5 tions for redundancy if new measures
6 are enacted.

7 (V) FILLING GAPS.—Rec-
8 ommendations to address overarching
9 gaps to threat information sharing.

10 (ii) TRAINING PROGRAM.—Rec-
11 ommendations concerning training, includ-
12 ing the following:

13 (I) Recommendations for cre-
14 ating a Federal interagency terrorism
15 training program to train officers and
16 employees of government departments
17 and agencies and relevant private en-
18 tities in matters relating to threats,
19 trends, and tailored opportunities for
20 prevention concerning both United
21 States-based terrorism threats that
22 are inspired by foreign terrorist orga-
23 nizations, or the ideology thereof, and
24 United States-based terrorism threats
25 that are not inspired by foreign ter-

1 rorist organizations, or the ideology
2 thereof.

3 (II) Recommendations concerning
4 additional training on investigation of
5 crimes concerning United States-
6 based terrorism threats that are not
7 inspired by foreign terrorist organiza-
8 tions, or the ideology thereof, under
9 current State and Federal legal struc-
10 tures and related crimes such as hate
11 crimes.

12 (III) Recommendations con-
13 cerning additional training on—

14 (aa) infrastructure and
15 mechanisms that allow law en-
16 forcement to report United
17 States-based terrorism threats
18 that are not inspired by foreign
19 terrorist organizations, or the
20 ideology thereof, and hate crimes;
21 and

22 (bb) information sharing
23 and dissemination.

24 (3) CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS NEEDS.—In
25 developing the report required by paragraph (1), the

1 Commission shall take into account the different
2 needs of Federal, State, local, and Tribal law en-
3 forcement agencies across the United States.

4 (4) REVIEW OF DRAFTS.—Before submitting a
5 report under paragraph (1), the chairperson of the
6 Commission shall ensure that a draft of the report
7 is made available to the Director of National Intel-
8 ligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the At-
9 torney General, and the Director of the Federal Bu-
10 reau of Investigation for review and to obtain feed-
11 back from the various legal, civil rights, and privacy
12 offices under their respective jurisdictions.

13 (5) ANNEXES.—The report under paragraph
14 (1) shall include a separate annex for each of the
15 following that highlights respective efforts to include
16 nationwide Federal, State, and local input, where
17 relevant, in preparation of the report:

18 (A) The Office of the Director of National
19 Intelligence.

20 (B) The Department of Homeland Secu-
21 rity.

22 (C) The Department of Justice.

23 (D) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

24 (6) PRESENTATION.—Information and compari-
25 sons in the report submitted under paragraph (a)

1 shall be presented in the report in both narrative
2 and visual graph form to clearly depict any dif-
3 ferences.

4 **SEC. 6. REPORTING TO CONGRESS.**

5 (a) REPORT ON ASSESSMENT, FINDINGS, AND REC-
6 COMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date
7 of the establishment of the Commission, the Director of
8 National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary
9 of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Di-
10 rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit
11 to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report
12 on the assessments, findings, and recommendations of the
13 Commission that were submitted to the Director of Na-
14 tional Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
15 the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bu-
16 reau of Investigation under section 5(b).

17 (b) ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF REC-
18 COMMENDATIONS.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
20 the date on which the final report is submitted
21 under subsection (a) and not less frequently than
22 once each year thereafter for 10 years, the Director
23 of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with
24 the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney
25 General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

1 Investigation, submit to the appropriate committees
2 of Congress a report on any action taken to imple-
3 ment the recommendations of the Commission.

4 (2) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted under
5 paragraph (1) shall include the following:

6 (A) Information relating to the number of
7 recommendations implemented and the status
8 of the implementation.

9 (B) An assessment of future trends, chal-
10 lenges, and opportunities, including new tech-
11 nologies, that will affect Federal, State, local,
12 and Tribal government department and agency
13 efforts to continue to improve information shar-
14 ing regarding all forms of terrorism.

15 **SEC. 7. COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.**

16 (a) RULES AND PROCEDURES.—The Commission
17 shall operate via established interagency terms and proce-
18 dures for researching and drafting interagency reports re-
19 lating to terrorism and information sharing.

20 (b) PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—
21 An employee of the Office of the Director of National In-
22 telligence, the Department of Homeland Security, the De-
23 partment of Justice, or the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
24 tion may be required to participate in the Commission on
25 a part-time or full-time basis.

1 (c) RECEIVING COMPREHENSIVE INPUT.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall—

3 (A) solicit input by including local partners
4 in the Commission, as required by section
5 4(b)(1);

6 (B) solicit nationwide input through the
7 Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
8 the Department of Homeland Security, the De-
9 partment of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of
10 Investigation;

11 (C) solicit input by conducting local field
12 interviews where the Commission considers
13 doing so appropriate and cost productive; and

14 (D) solicit input from independent inter-
15 agency advisory boards, including the Senior
16 Advisory Group of the Office of the Director of
17 National Intelligence, the Homeland Security
18 Advisory Board, the Executive Advisory Board,
19 the Homeland Security and Law Enforcement
20 Partners Board, and the Privacy and Civil Lib-
21 erties Oversight Board.

22 (2) TARGETS OF SOLICITATION.—Those from
23 whom input is solicited under paragraph (1) shall in-
24 clude:

25 (A) Fusion centers.

1 (B) Field offices.

2 (C) Local offices of United States Attor-
3 neys, including—

4 (i) offices in cities the Commission
5 considers large or urban; and

6 (ii) offices in cities the Commission
7 considers small or rural.

8 (D) Local representatives from the Federal
9 agencies represented in the membership of the
10 Commission.

11 (E) Local police departments.

12 (F) Offices of sheriffs.

13 (G) Offices of probation and pretrial serv-
14 ices.

15 (H) The various academies and training
16 offices of each of these Federal agencies rep-
17 resented in the membership of the Commission.

18 (I) State law enforcement agencies and
19 State investigative agencies.

20 (J) Privacy offices of each of the Federal
21 agencies represented in the membership of the
22 Commission.

23 (K) Civil rights and civil liberties offices of
24 each of the Federal agencies represented in the
25 membership of the Commission.

1 (L) Relevant screening, vetting, and
2 watchlisting offices of each of the Federal agen-
3 cies represented in the membership of the Com-
4 mission.

5 (M) Relevant offices within the Bureau of
6 Prisons of the Department of Justice.

7 **SEC. 8. TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.**

8 The Commission shall terminate 30 days after the
9 date on which the final report is submitted under section
10 6(a).

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