

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6010

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 5, 2018

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. PERRY, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. PITTENGER, and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be referred to as the “Countering the
5 Chinese Government and Communist Party’s Political In-
6 fluence Operations Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—Unless otherwise specified, the term “appro-
5 priate congressional committees” means—

6 (A) in the House of Representatives—

7 (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs;

8 (ii) the Committee on Armed Services;

9 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations;

10 (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary;

11 (v) the Committee on Education and

12 the Workforce; and

13 (vi) the Permanent Select Committee

14 on Intelligence; and

15 (B) in the Senate—

16 (i) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
17 tions;

18 (ii) the Committee on Armed Services;

19 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations;

20 (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary;

21 (v) the Committee on Health, Edu-
22 cation, Labor, and Pensions; and

23 (vi) the Select Committee on Intel-
24 ligence.

25 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—Un-
26 less otherwise specified, the term “political influence

1 operations” means efforts to coerce and corrupt
2 United States interests, institutions, or individuals
3 and foster in the United States attitudes, behavior,
4 decisions, or outcomes favorable to the Chinese Gov-
5 ernment or Communist Party through coordinated
6 and often concealed application of disinformation,
7 press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted in-
8 vestments, corruption, or academic censorship.

9 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

11 (1) The Chinese Government and Communist
12 Party employ a wide range of political, informa-
13 tional, and economic measures to influence, coerce,
14 intimidate, or undermine United States interests or
15 the interests of United States partners and allies.

16 (2) According to the December 2017 National
17 Security Strategy of the United States of America,
18 “[A]lthough the United States seeks to continue to
19 cooperate with China, China is using economic in-
20 ducements and penalties, influence operations, and
21 implied military threats to persuade other states to
22 heed its political and security agenda.”.

23 (3) The political influence operations efforts of
24 the Chinese Government and Communist Party have
25 received less scrutiny than the efforts of the Russian

1 Government, but given China's economic strength
2 and the growing apparatus being used to spread its
3 influence globally, efforts to promote its authori-
4 tarian ideal pose significant and consequential long-
5 term challenges to United States interests and val-
6 ues.

7 (4) The Chinese Government and Communist
8 Party use both overt and covert means to target the
9 political and economic elite, the media and public
10 opinion, civil society and academia, and members of
11 the Chinese diaspora.

12 (5) The Chinese Government and Communist
13 Party employs an array of government entities,
14 friendship and exchange organizations, and govern-
15 ment funded foundations, think-tanks, educational
16 and other projects to carry out political influence op-
17 erations, often called "united front work".

18 (6) The Chinese Government and Communist
19 Party's political influence operations aim is to secure
20 the regime's political stability domestically and
21 spread globally its political and economic model as
22 superior to those of Western democracies.

23 (7) The Chinese Government and Communist
24 Party's political influence operations take advantage
25 of the open and democratic nature of the United

1 States, including constitutional protections for free
2 speech and a free press, and the desire by some indi-
3 viduals or institutions to attract Chinese investment,
4 gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater
5 global influence.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that the Chinese Government and Communist Par-
8 ty’s political influence operations are not “soft power” in-
9 tended to persuade, but “sharp power” intended to pene-
10 trate or corrupt democratic countries, foster attitudes and
11 behavior favorable to the Chinese Government’s interest
12 through disinformation, coercion, and other means, and
13 to widen the scope of authoritarian influence globally. It
14 is further the sense of Congress that Congress and the
15 American public need reliable and current information to
16 understand the malign goals of these political influence op-
17 erations, identify the key institutions, individuals, entities,
18 and ministries that carry out such operations, and distin-
19 guish them from the cultural, educational, and people-to-
20 people exchanges which benefit both the United States and
21 China.

22 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
23 United States to—

24 (1) clearly differentiate between the Chinese
25 people and culture and the Chinese Government and

1 Communist Party in official statements, media, and
2 messaging, and to ensure that efforts to curtail Bei-
3 jing’s political influence operations do not lead to
4 the targeting of Chinese-Americans or the Chinese
5 diaspora, as they are most often the victims and pri-
6 mary targets of political influence operations;

7 (2) take steps to ensure that Chinese nationals
8 who are legally studying, living, or working tempo-
9 rarily in the United States know that intimidation or
10 surveillance by the Chinese Government and Com-
11 munist Party is an unacceptable invasion of their
12 rights while they reside in the United States;

13 (3) enhance cooperation and coordination with
14 Australia, Canada, and Taiwan (Republic of China),
15 whose governments and institutions have faced acute
16 pressure from the Chinese Government and Com-
17 munist Party’s political influence operations, and
18 with other allies globally, to counter such operations,
19 curtail advances of authoritarian ideals that chal-
20 lenge democratic values and international human
21 rights norms, and create strategies to ensure coun-
22 tries in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast
23 Asia, and elsewhere are aware of China’s “sharp
24 power” and work collaboratively to counter coercive,
25 covert, and corrupting elements;

1 (4) develop a strategic assessment and long-
2 term strategy to counter the Chinese Government
3 and Communist Party's political influence oper-
4 ations, censorship, propaganda, and disinformation
5 that undermines democratic institutions, targets
6 United States citizens or nationals or intimidates
7 their families in China; and uses economic tools,
8 market access, cyberattacks, or other capabilities to
9 undermine the freedoms of speech, expression, press,
10 association, assembly, religion, or academic thought;

11 (5) implement more advanced transparency re-
12 quirements concerning collaboration with Chinese
13 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks,
14 and government officials, among others, and raise
15 awareness, through various forums about the goals
16 and methods of the Chinese Government and Com-
17 munist Party's political influence operations and
18 common patterns and approaches used by Chinese
19 intelligence agencies or related actors;

20 (6) require Confucius Institutes, and any other
21 think tanks, academic programs, or nongovern-
22 mental organizations funded primarily by the Chi-
23 nese Government or Chinese Government-affiliated
24 entities and operating in the United States, to reg-

1 ister under section 2 of the Foreign Agents Reg-
2 istration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 612);

3 (7) seek ways to increase Chinese language pro-
4 ficiency among mid-career professionals; and

5 (8) create more flexible tools to screen invest-
6 ments from Chinese Government or Chinese Govern-
7 ment-backed sources to protect against the takeover
8 of United States companies by Chinese state-owned
9 or state-driven entities, and to protect institutions or
10 business sectors critically important to United States
11 national security and the viability of democratic in-
12 stitutions.

13 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND COM-**
14 **MUNIST PARTY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE OP-**
15 **ERATIONS.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
18 in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal depart-
19 ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con-
20 gressional committees an unclassified report on Chinese
21 Government and Communist Party political influence op-
22 erations with respect to the United States, including ef-
23 forts to corrupt United States governmental or nongovern-
24 mental institutions or individuals, efforts to coerce or
25 threaten United States citizens or legal permanent resi-

1 dents or their families or relatives living in China, and
2 efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the free-
3 doms of speech, expression, press, association, assembly,
4 religion, or academic thought.

5 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub-
6 section (a) shall also include recommendations for the
7 President and Congress relating to the following:

8 (1) Whether additional resources or authorities
9 are needed to counter Chinese Government and
10 Communist Party's political influence operations in
11 the United States, including in concert with allies.

12 (2) Ways to use existing resources to develop
13 core competencies among Federal agencies and the
14 Armed Forces in the subject area of Chinese polit-
15 ical influence operations.

16 (3) The advisability of establishing, within the
17 Department of State, a permanent office relating to
18 Chinese Government and Communist Party's polit-
19 ical influence operations.

20 (4) Whether regular public reports on the Chi-
21 nese Government and Communist Party's political
22 influence operations are needed to inform Congress
23 and the American public of the scale and scope of
24 such operations.

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